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BEYOND THE BODY
Love, wind eggs, and mere conceptions: non-
generation in William Harvey’s De conceptione
Isabel Davis
Birkbeck, University of London, UK
ABSTRACT
This essay oﬀers a new reading of William Harvey’s De conceptione, considering
for the ﬁrst time its interest in non-generative conception. Further, it considers
the way that Harvey entangles observations about erotic and maternal love in
his discussions of the conceiving body. Love provides a context which Harvey
reads for information about conception. But, for Harvey, conception and
generation are not synonymous. Conceptions can be without as well as with a
foetus, and Harvey is at least as interested in non-generation as he is in
generation, and false pregnancy as pregnancy. Harvey’s notion of an
immaterial or ‘mere’ conception, on which he builds an intricate analogy
about the relation of uterus and brain, is designed to accommodate un-
reproductive as well as reproductive experience. Reading signs of love –
desires, devotions, intimacies – gives Harvey a way of distinguishing between
diﬀerent kinds of reproductive non-events, health and pathology. He oﬀers an
extended consideration of wind eggs and uses ﬁctions of the wind to credit
the loves of those that produce no oﬀspring as nonetheless creatively
conceiving and biologically demonstrative.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 18 December 2018; Accepted 23 July 2019
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William Harvey’s writing on conception is necessarily caught up with the
question of love: both the erotic love which precedes conception and the
maternal love emergent in its aftermath. This essay considers how these
kinds of love are implicated in Harvey’s understanding of conception. As
well as considering forms of human love, my discussion also takes in the
cross-species love of a pet – a parrot – for its owner – Harvey’s wife Elizabeth
– and the evidence it gave Harvey for understanding the place of sexual love in
un-reproductive health and illness. The relationships between love and con-
ception are, in Harvey’s view, very close. In particular, in an odd little treatise,
De conceptione, which is appended to Harvey’s larger work Exercitationes de
generatione animalium, he describes an intimate relationship between brain
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Isabel Davis i.davis@bbk.ac.uk
TEXTUAL PRACTICE
2019, VOL. 33, NO. 8, 1321–1340
https://doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2019.1648100
and uterus, an idea of conception which is thoroughly embedded in the ‘psy-
chophysiology’ of his age, which read biology and the passions together.1
Some modern scholarly accounts of Harvey’s brain and uterus analogy have
dismissed it as ‘failed’ and even ‘ludicrous’, in particular because of its depen-
dence on an error: the impression that there was no material connection
between sperm and embryo, and that conception was therefore immaterially
produced.2 Some, too, have been disappointed that Harvey, so evidently
proto-modern in his discovery of the circulation of the blood, did not
evade the strictures of history in his work on generation.3 However, these dis-
satisﬁed critical accounts have overlooked the fact that Harvey’s thinking was
informed not just by the question of generation, but also by non-generation, a
topic for which immateriality is more germane. In this essay I rehabilitate De
conceptione, discussing it alongside the larger work De generatione to which it
is appended, as an articulate account of non-reproductive experience, using
the work of feminist Elizabeth A. Wilson on the psychosomatic to listen to
Harvey’s ideas anew.4 In particular this essay recognises that Harvey’s
account of the immateriality of conception gave him a way to understand
loves which were without issue, as nonetheless conceiving, image-making,
and biologically demonstrative.
First, I lay out the analogy between conceptions in the brain and uterus
which principally concerns De conceptione before later setting this analogy
within a picture of erotic and maternal aﬀections. In De conceptione,
Harvey speculates on the relationship between the physiological and psycho-
logical eﬀects of the sexual act:
the vertue proceeding from theMale, doth so largely fructiﬁe the whole Female,
that it produceth a thorough change and alteration, as well as the frame of their
minds, as in the constitution of their bodies. (541)
The eﬀect of sex, he concludes, is not local to, and does not isolate the sexual
or reproductive organs, such as the uterus. Instead, masculine ‘vertue’ (virtus),
or power, transforms the entire woman, body and mind together. Harvey
arrives at this position, on the unity of mind and the female reproductive
body, through one of his central observations about animal generation,
which he returns to regularly in his work: the absence of any appreciable con-
tinuous mass linking sperm and embryo:
since I plainly see that nothing at all doth remaine in the Uterus after coition,
whereunto I might ascribe the principle of generation; no more then remaines
in the braine after sensation, and experience, whereunto the principle of Artmay
be reduced. (546)
This material absence or gap was observed through dissection of animals at
diﬀerent temporal points between coitus and the time when an embryo
could be seen with the naked eye. These two quotations oﬀer diﬀering,
though related propositions. In the second, brain and uterus share only the
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habit of making copies without direct material connection with their originals;
they are thus only rhetorically related. On the other hand, in the ﬁrst quota-
tion, Harvey suggests a much more integrated account of the female mind and
reproductive body. Here, the changes that take place in the uterus after sex are
not just similar to the changes that take place in the brain after sensation and
experience; instead, sex is sensation and experience and it alters the mind at
the same time as it eﬀects change in the uterus.
Thus Harvey develops an ambiguous notion of how alike the uterus and
brain are; so that at times he brings together the diﬀerent propositions rep-
resented in these two quotations, and at others he holds them further apart.
That vacillation about their exact relation can be seen in this passage, in
which Harvey lays out his analogy again, but with variation:
and seeing the substance of the Uterus, now ready for Conception, doth so
neerly resemble the Constitution of the Braine: why may we not imagine,
that both their functions are also alike; and that something like, if not the
self same thing that the phantasme, or appetite is to the brain is excited in
the Uterus: from which the generation or procreation of the Egge doth
succeed? For both their functions are equally called conceptions, and both are
Immaterial. (542–3)
Here, Harvey considers the exact relation between conceptions in the brain
and the uterus to be uncertain, oﬀering alternatives – ‘something like, if not
the self same thing’ (istuc idem, vel saltem ejus analogum) (295). Whilst
Harvey’s ﬁgure is usually understood in modern critical scholarship as an
analogy, in fact he never rules out the prospect of these two kinds of con-
ception being not just rhetorical substitutes but being identical, naturally
and irrevocably inseparable. In that respect, Harvey prevaricates over what
Charis Charalampous has termed ‘the intelligent body’; how far does the
body itself think?5 Correspondingly, in Harvey’s etymological and rhetorical
observation at the end here about the polysemy of conceptiones, he does not
spell out exactly how the two senses of the word relate and what a shared ety-
mology precisely means in this case. Again, he leaves the nature of the relation
undecided.
One aspect of this question about the degree of similarity between the two
organs is the rapport between look and function:
First of all the uterus appears thicker and more ﬂeshy: and afterwards (foras-
much as concerneth the interiour superﬁcies, which is the place where the
future conception is to be received) it groweth more tender, answering in lubri-
city and softness to the internal ventricles of the Braine, as we have even now
aﬃrmed concerning Hindes, and other creatures which cleave the hoofe. (542)
Observing the visual and textural similarity between the increasing ﬂeshiness
of the endometrium in the later, luteal phase of the mammalian menstrual
cycle, and the sponginess of brain tissue, Harvey notes that the uterus
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becomes more or less brain-like depending on its receptivity to and readiness
for conception. Harvey cannot come to a deﬁnitive conclusion on the exact
proximity between brain and womb because they constantly move together
and apart, in rhythmic relation to cyclical change. Time and seasonality are
critical factors in Harvey’s understanding of this rhetorical proximity
between womb and mind.
Whenever Harvey thinks about seasonal change, springtime coupling and
the birds’ broodiness, he turns to Book II of Virgil’s Georgics, which attributes
this ripening in the natural world to the inﬂuence of Zephyrus:
Zephyrique terpentibus auris
Laxant arva sinus, superat tener omnibus humor,
Parturit omnis ager, etc’. (De generatione, Latin 38)
[the meadows ungirdle to the Zephyr’s balmy breeze; the tender moisture avails
for all, the bounteous earth prepares to give birth].6
After this quotation Harvey oﬀers this analysis: ‘[a]nd therefore the people of
old, seeing their Hens in the Spring-time lay, this wind then blowing, did con-
ceive Zephyrus to be the Author of the generation of those eggs’ [Zephyrum
eorundem procreationis autorem crediderunt] (68; Latin 38). The personiﬁca-
tion of Zephyrus anthropomorphises springtime proliferation, writing it as
erotic verse. Harvey recognises that Zephyrus’s authorship is a poetic or folk-
loric conceit; nonetheless he ﬁnds this amatory ﬁction useful to think through
reproductive and sexual maturation, demonstrating what Gail Kern Paster has
described as the ‘oscillation of metaphorical and literal comparisons between
the wind and the passions’ in early modern culture.7 If being alike and being
the same thing are on a spectrum of relation, rather than being opposites,
moving together and apart in relation to cyclical time, then the brain and
uterus’s rhetorical proximity, the distance between ﬁction and fact, also par-
ticipates in this shifting natural drama. So, how alike the brain and the uterus
are in their conceiving of things depends upon cyclical ripening, just in the
same way that hens grow broody in the spring. The womb is ideational and
imaginative seasonally and best understood with reference to ﬁctions that
embed human sexual love in a wider reproductive ecosystem.
When Harvey thinks about the brain and its making of copies, reproduc-
tion in the broadest sense, he thinks about it in two ways. On the one hand, in
some parts of his treatise, he makes a particular example of the artistic brain:
‘how the brain of the Artist, or the Artist himself, by virtue of his brain, doth
form things which are not present with him, but such as he only hath formerly
seen, so much to the life’ (545). On the other hand, at the same time, Harvey
makes a special case of the female brain, understanding heterosexual female
desire to be instigated by a sensory perception of the external male body,
the ‘appetible or desirable object’ (543), which enters the brain through the
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eye. This cognitive process – in an artist’s or a woman’s brain – is ‘artiﬁcial’ or
‘animal conception’ [conceptus artiﬁcialies / animalis, 295–6], and Harvey
speculates that an analogous process operates in the uterus, which he dubs
‘natural conception’ [conceptus naturalis], which forms the child in the
image of its father. Of ‘natural conception’, Harvey writes: ‘[a]nd from this
Appetite or Conception it cometh to pass, that the female doth produce an
oﬀspring like the male Genitor’ (543). In these terms, ‘animal conception’
diﬀers from ‘natural conception’ in that it proceeds from cognitive agency,
happening in the brain rather than the uterus. Incidentally, elsewhere,
Harvey considers how it is that children resemble both parents and ‘must
needs be mixt’ (De generatione 260–1, see also De conceptione 555), but
here he is interested in how, without material transmission, the idea or
form of the father is realised in the oﬀspring. Because there is no appreciable
connector, Harvey transfers the authority for ‘natural conception’ to a uterine
‘appetite’ as much as to the masculine virtus to which it responds.
In her study of the politics of Harvey’s analogies, Eve Keller rightly argues
that Harvey’s writings are ‘ﬁlled with sex stories’.8 She has also found Harvey
to settle primarily on masculine dominance and female passivity quite in the
face of the logic of his own ﬁndings on the ovum; she describes him ‘taking
back his assertions of her [i.e. woman’s] procreative agency’.9 Yet, those
places at which Harvey departs from Aristotelian authority to write feminine
agency in conception remain points of issue in his work, rather than being
cancelled as Keller suggests.10 Harvey displaced the gendering inherent in tra-
ditional accounts of Aristotelian hylomorphism – that matter was feminine
and naturally inclined to masculine form – by crediting feminine conception
with cognitive forming agency. At the same time he kept the notion of female
inclination or desire in his accounts of conception; so feminine desire for a
male partner was met by, was similar to or perhaps the self-same thing as a
desire within the uterus, both were image forming and potentially reproduc-
tive.11 Thus Harvey breaks up the neat gender binary which often attended
accounts of matter-form relations to come to his notion of the ‘mixt’ con-
ception. In this way ‘animal conceptions’ were as much female as male, and
as much the responsibility of women as were ‘natural conceptions’. Indeed,
Keller herself concludes that Harvey’s masculine posturing is unconvincing;
so, as it turns out, Harvey’s position is an unsettled prevarication which, as
James G. Lennox notes, contradicts Aristotle to argue for male and female
as co-eﬃcient causes in reproduction.12
The relationship Harvey draws between these parallel kinds of conception,
natural and animal, bears much in common with the contemporary idea of
the maternal imagination, the notion that the foetus could be imprinted
with those things that women viewed in pregnancy: their partners, of
course, but also images or objects.13 As theories of paternal heredity they
share an understanding of the mind and the body as very close, and the
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uterus as image forming. On the other hand, however, Harvey’s notion is
diﬀerent. Indeed, the notion of the maternal imagination mixes up Harvey’s
two ideas of conception: the animal and the natural, making animal con-
ception operate through sight rather than through the immaterial virtue of
sperm. In the maternal imagination model, instead of the uterus being itself
brain-like and intelligent, the uterus is governed by and subordinate to the
brain and, so, sense perception. In Harvey’s version, paternal heredity is com-
municated as if by sight and, whilst it is then conceived, or interpreted, inside
the female body, that conception is carried out by the uterus rather than the
brain. Another diﬀerence is that the idea of the maternal imagination was
linked particularly to teratology, a way of explaining foetal abnormality as
well as paternal resemblance. Harvey is interested in foetal development,
and of thinking about heredity in terms of image theory, but the emphasis
in De conceptione is on the prior conception event. Rather than trying to
answer questions about the generation of monsters, Harvey was researching
the moment and mechanism of conception, especially given its apparent
immateriality.
I return now to that starting point: the lack of material relation, the gap,
between sperm and embryo, because it has been important for other critical
responses to De conceptione. Of course, since Harvey, the gap he observed
has been inﬁlled by new discoveries in endocrinology, reproductive physiology,
genetics and embryology. Historians of science point out that, because Harvey
was looking without the beneﬁt of a microscope, although that technology was
available, he missed the material continuity within conception.14 As it turns
out, there is no gap. Historians have addressed the problems they see predi-
cated on this omission in a number of related ways. Benjamin Goldberg under-
stands Harvey’s analogies as valuable ‘thought-experiments’.15 Nonetheless he
concludes that the central brain-uterus analogy fails, and, picking up Harvey’s
etymological observation about the word conceptiones which I cited above,
concludes that the analogy ‘now seems a ludicrous theory based upon, at
best, homonymy’, a view which places linguistic practice a long way from
any ‘truth’ about the body.16 Goldberg distances his own reading from that
of Guido Giglioni: that Harvey illicitly pressed unlike things together: psychol-
ogy and physiology.17 Goldberg notes that analogies are supposed to pair
unalike things.18 In this way, like Giglioni, Goldberg also assumes a radical dis-
tinction of ‘psychological’ and ‘organic’ or physiological categories. Relatedly,
in Lennox’s view, Harvey’s use of Aristotle’s theory of forms does not work,
because he obscures his own investigation by ‘relying on metaphors of con-
scious intention to clarify natural teleology’.19 For all these scholars, despite
the diﬀering shades and weights of their assessments, Harvey’s analogy proble-
matically presses intentionality together with natural process. In these critical
estimations, ‘animal’ and ‘natural’ conceptions, to use Harvey’s terms, are not
the same or even similar.
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The accusation from Goldberg, Giglioni, and Lennox here is that Harvey
falls into the trap that, from his own time, Aristotelian teleology had always
been understood to be: that it was animistic or anthropomorphising.20 As
Steven Shapin and others have described, the ‘human-scaled’ Aristotelian
accounts of nature were falling out of fashion, being replaced by ‘mechanical
philosophy’, so-called because it compared nature, not to the rational human
in the way that Aristotle did, but to the machine. Amongst Harvey’s contem-
poraries, then, purpose and intention were not usually, in correct accounts,
assigned to natural entities. Yet, just as microscopes have gained currency
since Harvey, so has the unconscious. In his example, Harvey is not
oﬀering animist motivations or sentience to stones or plants; rather, he is con-
cerned with the animal, and often the human animal. Furthermore, whilst of
course modern scientists use microscopes, I suggest that lay bodily experience,
whether modern or early modern, is actually more closely aligned with
Harvey’s ﬁndings. The interior of the uterus is still not visible to the eye
outside of the clinic, and women cannot dissect themselves, like one of
Harvey’s chickens or deer, and deploy the microscope technology that he
overlooked. That Harvey, like everyone else, was bound by available knowl-
edge and supplied terms is an undeniable fact; indeed, Harvey himself
hopes that: ‘whatsoever falleth from me concerning this subject, I desire
may not be so taken, as if I conceived them pronounced by an Oracle’
(539). As Noga Arikha says of Harvey’s loyalty to the increasingly unfashion-
able Aristotle: ‘[r]ather than dismiss his predecessors, Harvey looked anew,
and found that the past could be used’.21 Approaching it from this perspective,
I ask: what can be used from Harvey’s De conceptione, and particularly to con-
sider false pregnancy?
What goes unnoticed in modern historians’ rejections of Harvey’s brain-
uterus analogy is that Harvey is not only and principally interested in gener-
ation. Rather, he is concerned with conception and, for Harvey, generation
and conception are diﬀerent things. Indeed, De conceptione begins and is
motivated by non-generation and, in particular, the perplexing issue of false
pregnancy:
For though the female sometimes (conceiving after coition [post coitum, conci-
piens]) doth not produce a Foetus: yet we know that those Symptomes did
ensue, which gave a cleare testimony [claram ﬁdem] of a conception set on
foot [peractae], (though it came to nothing.) (540; Latin 294)
The ﬁrst parenthesis makes the case unequivocally: it is possible to have con-
ceived even in the absence of a foetus. The next clause reiterates: Harvey’s
knowledge comes from the appearance of symptoms which produce a clear
promise or guarantee (ﬁdem) of a conception achieved (peractae). In his
view, false pregnancies are conceptions. Because he cannot see continuous
matter, Harvey concludes that: ‘[w]e have no refuge left us, but to ﬂy to
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meere Conception [merum conceptum], and reception of Species without any
matter [speciumque sine materia receptionem]’ (547; Latin 297). Latin
merum carries a sense of purity and is not perfectly translated by modern
English ‘mere’, insigniﬁcant or feeble. Of course this is what Harvey proposes
for all conceptions, fruitful or not, yet the idea of the ‘mere conception’
enables him to include non-generative conceptions in his understanding of
what happens inside the body after sex. To read it in the terms of Harvey’s
own analogy, an artist might conceive an idea, suﬀering the pangs attendant
on artistic process, but, then, not generate the work. Sex generates expec-
tations which may not always deliver.
False pregnancy was a signiﬁcant concern in Harvey’s time, being fully dis-
cussed in a number of culturally apparent places. This is shown, for example,
by Jonathan Gil Harris in his discussion of pregnancy and dropsy, both on the
Renaissance stage and in the political debates concerning the childlessness of
queens Mary and Elizabeth.22 A range of diﬀerent conditions resembled, and
were read as pregnancy: Harris particularly discusses dropsy or windy
tympany, which swelled the abdomen. Cathy McClive has discussed other
possible confusions, for example around molar pregnancy, and also made
the larger point that all pregnancies were ambiguous at least until quicken-
ing.23 The discussion of false pregnancy also recognised that sometimes
there was no identiﬁable organic cause or lesion. In these cases psyche and
soma seemed mutually bound, creating the symptoms of pregnancy even in
the absence of any embryonic or extraembryonic tissue. Negative diagnoses
were likely more diﬃcult to establish than positives, producing longer
phases of ambiguity in the case of those suﬀering with infertility. When the
midwife Jane Sharp discusses false pregnancy she prevaricates, writing that:
‘[t]o distinguish then false conceptions from true, but if there be both true
and false at once that is very hard to know’.24 Although she writes as if
‘true’ and ‘false’ conceptions can be diﬀerentiated, giving them diﬀerent and
contrary labels, at the same time they are hard to tell apart, unless, and this
is baﬄing, the conception is both true and false at once. Her statement is cir-
cular, maybe even a joke: indeterminate diagnoses are the only ones available
and yet can only be accurate if the pregnancy is itself actually somehow inde-
terminate. Sharp’s indecision is revealing about the very diﬃcult diagnostic
frame in which Harvey’s investigations sit.
The psychophysiology or intelligence of early modern bodies and, more
speciﬁcally, Harvey’s thinking about a brain-like uterus, oﬀer a way in to
thinking about the confounding case of the somatoform kind of false preg-
nancy. To begin this task, I return to Harvey’s concern with the artistic
brain and ‘animal conception’. Harvey considers a spectrum of ‘animal con-
ceptions’ and not just the one I’ve already discussed – the case of the artist
producing life-like depictions or sculptural forms. First, he notes, birds
‘which immure themselves all winter, do exactly chant, and recall to minde
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those Ditties, the next Spring, which they had learned the Summer before,
though they did never practise them all the while’; secondly, he marvels at
birds that can build nests, and spiders that can spin webs exactly similar to
others that they have never seen, ‘and that not from her memory, or any
habit implanted in her, but onely by meere phansie’ [sola phantasia] (545;
Latin 296). Harvey’s point is, again, about the immaterial connection, the
gap between copies and originals, arranging his examples as more or less
‘strange’ according to how far they are mediated by a discernible or material
pattern. Harvey’s view of ﬁction here is that facticity emerges from immaterial
reproduction: that ‘meere phansie’ can bring into being a nest, a web, a song.
By framing animals and humans together, Harvey also explores a spectrum
of ‘animal conception’ which ranges from conscious, cerebral acts to involun-
tary and instinctual ones which already look a great deal like the ‘natural con-
ceptions’ that occur in thewomb. In thisway, ‘animal conception’ also opens up
a question for Harvey about the nervous system: not only about how the uterus
is like the ﬁction-making brain but also about how the brain, operating beyond
as well as within consciousness, is like the uterus: conceiving of things without
being aware of itself as engaged in a process of thought. In his 1627manuscript
work on the nervous system,De motu locali animalium, Harvey marks out the
uterus as being like other organs outside conscious control, like ‘separate living
creature(s)’, such as the heart, and the intestines, contrasting them with those
that were wholly or partially subject to the will, like the muscles or lungs.25
Whilst, of course, the heart is diﬀerent to the uterus and other organs of the
autonomic nervous system, nonetheless it oﬀers a model which unseats cer-
ebral priority. In these notes on nerves, Harvey also thinks about bodily pro-
cesses: the release of semen and childbirth are not subject to the will,
whereas swallowing and, partially, vomiting are.26 He complicates this
picture of the relation between consciousness andmovement, however, by con-
ceding that the voluntary nervous system might operate even when we forget,
or pay no attention to it.27 Harvey also recognises that ideas can produce invo-
luntary physical change: people shudder at fearful thoughts, for example, and
their ‘parched mouths run a water at talke of sower thinges’.28 Quite apart
from his work on the uterus and generation, Harvey asks how thoughts and
passions canmanifest themselves somatically, independently of conscious will.
In his assessment of Harvey’s uterus-brain analogy, Giglioni, asks: ‘are the
transfers of meaning between the reproductive and the nervous systems at
their end with Harvey?’, to which he expects the answer: yes, ﬁnding that bio-
chemistry and genetics have dismantled earlier metaphoric thought-struc-
tures which made that transfer.29 However, we can answer this question
diﬀerently by turning to the work of feminist Elizabeth A. Wilson, who
ﬁnds that the nervous system is indeed implicated in the workings of the
whole body, a body which includes the reproductive system. In her book Psy-
chosomatic, Wilson challenges the resistance to biology in contemporary
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feminism, in order to recognise the role of the body, as well as the encultured
mind, in psychosomatic conditions. In doing so she recommends a recovery
of pre-disciplinary accounts of the relation of mind and body which present
them as together and indivisible. Harvey oﬀers ways to think about somato-
form conditions, which, as Wilson argues, require the participation of both
brain and periphery. Psychology, or a ‘proclivity to conversion’, Wilson con-
cludes, is ‘native to biochemical, physiological, and nervous systems’.30 In this
way, Wilson maintains that puzzling relationships between soma and psyche
are ‘not just in the head’; that psychological responses are produced at the
place they are felt. A paralysed arm, for example, can manifest bereavement
because the arm itself thinks. In this view, the body is intelligent in the way
that Charalampous notes early modern commentators always imagined.31
That the uterus functions like, or in exactly the same way as a brain, as
Harvey suggests, is exactly what Wilson oﬀers: the body as ‘a system of
mutual constitution from which no particular element emerges as the origin-
ary, predetermining term’.32
Wilson has suggested indeed that we reclaim the older, Hippocratic notion
of the errant womb as a potentially useful ﬁgure encapsulating a truth about
all organs, male and female: that they are vagrant. Perhaps, she argues, ‘all
biology wanders. Formulated this way, hysterical diversion is not forced on
the throat, legs, or eyes from the outside, it is already part of the natural reper-
toire of biological matter’.33 Wilson oﬀers to Harvey a model of how a passion,
like love, might be biologically implicated at a site, like the uterus, beyond the
conscious or unconscious governance of the brain. Harvey oﬀers Wilson a
number of related advances on her reclamation exercise. First, although in
his writing on generation Harvey is necessarily principally concerned with
the uterus, the psychophysiology which underpins his thinking, already de-
particularises that organ, understanding it to be psychologically entangled
only in the same way that other organs are, and those potentially of both
men and women. For Harvey hysteria and other uterine pathologies are
clearly diﬀerent and not the condition of everywoman. Thus he sees that
the entwinedness of body and mind can be part of a picture with health as
much as illness. Finally, Harvey supplies a ready way of considering particu-
larly non-reproductive experience in relation to psychophysiology.
The proximity, similarity or interchangeability between body and brain
allows us to see how, for Harvey, passions, like love and desire, not only
motivate one human animal to move towards another but, before that, how
passions cause motion within the biology of that animal. In what follows I
look more closely at how diﬀerent forms of love drive distinctions between
uterine function and dysfunction, considering non-generation, as Harvey
did, in relation to ﬁctions of the wind. In particular, throughout his work
on generation, Harvey takes a special interest in wind eggs. They are variously
referred to by the Latin terms ‘improliﬁca, irrita, hypenemia, sive
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subventanea, & Zephyria’ (37), the last three of these register, as does the
English ‘wind egg’, the perception that ‘they were begotten by the winde’
(68). The relationship to the wind enables an agnosticism – wind was a
sign of both vacancy and of life, of ﬂatulence and breath – an agnosticism
which was useful given the diﬃculties of diagnosis acknowledged by Sharp.
This agnosticism had blown from the ancient world and through the
Middle Ages. Early pregnancy was hard to diagnose in just the same way
that wind eggs looked like fruitful ones. Birds’ wind eggs had been a
concern and curiosity since Aristotle, and were regularly discussed in encyclo-
paedias for example, throughout the Middle Ages.34 As we have seen, windy
dropsy was a condition in which wind swelled the abdomen in a way which
resembled pregnancy.35 Yet equally, wind, as divine breath, inspired and enso-
uled the quickening foetus in all pregnancies, and was invoked to explain the
exceptional case of the Virgin conception.36 From the ancient to the Renais-
sance world, the microcosmic body was in ecological relation to the larger
macrocosm; wind and water blew and ﬂowed through people, connecting
their bodies and passions, in close combination, to the cosmos.37 Wind,
then, refused human exceptionalism, making no distinction between people
and the natural world. All life was animated by wind but, equally, eggs that
did not hatch and apparent pregnancies which did not deliver, hollow
rounded-out forms, were put down to the wind.
Using the ideas he inherited, Harvey draws speciﬁc conclusions about
human non-generation from his observation of birds’ wind eggs. He notes
in De motu locali: ‘homo enim the text, the other the comment’ [for man is
the text and the other, i.e. the animal, is the commentary], unthinkingly
code-switching just at the point when he meets the human/animal species
barrier.38 In the case of conception, the exteriority of birds’ eggs oﬀer a
legible commentary on the resistant interiority of the human reproductive
text. Yet the wind egg, more speciﬁcally, gives Harvey a way to think about
diﬀerent kinds of non-generation. In poultry rearing, when hens are kept
from the cock, Harvey ﬁnds they ‘not onely conceive egges, but lay them
also’ [non solum ova concipit, sed & parit etiam] (27; Latin 15). So, at one
end of the spectrum, cyclical signs of fertility and particularly menstruation
are understood by comparison to wind eggs. Wind eggs are produced even
without intercourse, part of the regular round of the reproductive cycle.
Although Harvey uses the verb concipere here, he makes a clear distinction
between eggs and conceptions (between the nouns conceptus and conceptio),
throughout his work. De conceptione earns its title by being concerned with
conceptions proper; because De conceptione is principally presented as a sol-
ution to the puzzle of the missing spermatic mass, it is necessarily only con-
cerned with post-coital events. At the other end of the spectrum from
menstruation and other cyclical signs of fertility, Harvey likens wind eggs
to non-generative conceptions after intercourse:
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Divers Women, whose Conception (like an addle Egge) is fruitles, and without a
Foetus, do suﬀer abortion the third moneth. I have often dissected an abortion
of that age (being of the bigness of a Goose-egg) wherein was a foetus, distinct in
all its parts; though their form was rough and unshapen’. (335–6)
Here Harvey is concerned with ﬁrst-trimester pregnancy loss, where the mis-
carried conceptus might possibly be with or without foetus. From menstrua-
tion and early miscarriage, to false pregnancy and conditions like dropsy
which resemble pregnancy, the wind egg is analogous to the multiple ways
in which generative potential is not realised.
Despite this wide range of ways of understanding the human wind egg, for
Harvey, sex or lack of it makes the diﬀerence, separating out conceptions –
whether with or without a foetus – from eggs. Blocked or satisﬁed erotic
desire acts on the body and changes it, even though it may not result in
oﬀspring. Although in De generatione Harvey discusses the way that birds
which are not mated try to incubate unfertilised eggs, in De conceptione
when he discusses birds inclined to sit on wind eggs, and also false pregnancy
in dogs, he is careful to add a clause about coitus. Bitches, he says, that ‘admit
coition’ can ‘have milk, or beestings (as they call it) in their teats; and are
obnoxious to the distempers of those that have really puppied’ (540). Similarly
birds, as dogs, present as if they have reproduced although they haven’t, build-
ing and sitting on their nests:
Some kinde of birds (as namely Pigeons) if they admit coitione at the wonted
time, though they lay no eggs at all, or subventaneous ones onely, yet are pos-
sessed with their usual sedulity & providence of building nests. (541)
This emphasis upon intercourse enables Harvey to disambiguate the animals
he considers here from the unmated ones he discusses in De generatione: in
their case, after sex, maternal habitus marks out a conception achieved.
Harvey’s observation of maternal behaviours in birds makes little distinction
between those whose eggs hatch, and those whose eggs do not. Because good
eggs cannot be told from bad except in time, Harvey uses aﬀective contexts –
desire; sex, both practised and inhibited; and maternal devotion or attention –
to distinguish them. Whilst Thomas Laqueur cites the objection that, if
Harvey’s account ‘were true, women should be able to conceive by just think-
ing about it’, Harvey might reply that women may well be able to conceive,
ﬁrst by having sexual intercourse and then afterwards by ‘thinking’ about it.39
Unsurprisingly, whether or not love and desire are expressed through the
sexual act is important in relation to reproduction; what is less obvious is that
sexual expression is also biologically momentous in the case of non-gener-
ation. Harvey takes the contemporary view that love-sick females who are
held back from a desired sexual life become ill. In De generatione Harvey
says he discovers this by observing his wife Elizabeth’s parrot. This is an
animal that he assumed was male, because it was so vocal and tuneful, an
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aspect of the amorousness it displays in its relationship with Elizabeth (24–5).
However, during the autopsy Harvey performs on the parrot after its death, he
discovers it to be female and to have a corrupted egg retained in its uterus. He
imagines that something similar can happen to girls:
As if it were the same thing for those creatures [ie some insects and hens] to be
with egge, as for virgins to have their wombs grow warm; their termes ﬂow, their
breasts increase, and (in a word) to become marriageable [viro maturam esse];
which if they be too long detained from, they are assaulted with dangerous
symptoms; (namely hysterical aﬀections, or furor Uterinus) or else fall into
the green sickness, and severall other distempers. For all Creatures [animalium],
when they are love-struck [cupidinis oestro percita], grow extravagant, and
debarred of enjoyment [nisi se invicem fruantur], do at length recede much
from their usual temper. Hence some women grow frantick for love; and this
extravagancy is so outragious in some, that they seem bewitched [venesicio
aﬄatae], planet-struck or possessed. (27–8; Latin 16)
In his discussion of hysterical aﬀections and related conditions here, Harvey is
not concerned with conception. Instead he charts what we might call sexual
repression as a cause of female sickness. In that sense, Harvey recognises
non-generative conception to be distinct from hysteria and associated con-
ditions, not a pathology but a relatively ordinary consequence of a sexual
life. Harvey’s narrow understanding of hysteria and related conditions,
then, does not ﬁt the picture of ‘Hysteria […] before 1750’, described by
Heather Meek as suﬀered by ‘all women’ ‘to some degree’.40
Harvey borrows the phrase ‘cupidinis oestro percita’ [literally: stirred by
the gadﬂy of desire], in the quotation above, from Robert Burton’s
Anatomy of Melancholy, where the oestrum, or bite of the gadﬂy, is evoked
to retell the story of Sappho and Phaon.41 This entomological image, which
implicitly casts people as cattle, oﬀers a suggestive metaphor, as animals
often do for Harvey, for how desire moves and changes the human body
quite involuntarily and beyond the reach of reason. Indeed, erotic impulses
are examples of some of the ‘inward principles’ – ‘desire, imagination,
choice, wish, passion, appetite’ – which he lists in De motu locali animalium
as causing movement within animals.42 Harvey’s appropriation of Burton
betrays a wider engagement with his work. Rather than using those bits of
the Anatomy that were particularly concerned with uterine and menstrual
health, Harvey instead cites and engages with Burton’s deﬁnitions and under-
standing of love sickness.43 In this respect Harvey resorts to the contemporary
correlation, which Helen King and Lesel Dawson have discussed, between
female love sickness and gynaecological diagnoses, and particularly green
sickness.44 Dawson has also argued that early modern love sickness implicated
the imagination: ‘[t]he lover dotes obsessively, not on the true physical form of
the beloved, but on the phantasm: the perceived, spiritual image that is
impressed upon his or her mind’.45 Indeed, traditionally in earlier medieval
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love literature the image of the beloved travelled into the lover’s heart through
the eye, through looking.46 By signing up to the associations between love
sickness and gynaecological pathology that emerged later to embellish this
relation between love and looking, Harvey produces a diﬀerent account of
how the female mind relates to the reproductive body in illness as opposed
to health. Frustrated desire, in love sickness, causes a pathological or cor-
rupted animal conception, whereas natural conceptions, whether generative
or not, are corollaries of a sexual life.
In the story of Elizabeth’s parrot, Harvey brings the question of the diﬀer-
ence between un-generative conception and uterine pathologies home. Eliza-
beth Spiller has also discussed this parrot in her satisfying account of Harvey’s
writing on generation.47 Spiller’s larger argument is that Harvey is as, if not
more, concerned with his own act of creation, his writing, as he is with repro-
duction more broadly, noting his emphasis on ‘ﬁction, art and fable’.48
Harvey, she writes, ‘is talking not so much about women, hens, or does as
about himself and his acts of scientiﬁc creation’.49 Spiller, though, sees
Harvey’s preoccupation as being with ‘pregnancy and parturition’, to ﬁt
with this reﬂexive interest in literary creation.50 Yet, as I have been arguing,
Harvey is at least as interested in non-generation, and particularly so in the
anecdote about the parrot. The account of Elizabeth’s parrot stands out for
its autobiographical interjection – this is the only place across his oeuvre
that Harvey mentions his wife – and what does it describe? Spiller suggests
that Harvey’s autopsy ﬁnds the bird to be ‘morbidly pregnant’; but that is
not so, as the bird was never mated.51 After all, what is pregnancy in birds?
As Harvey himself notes, the avian foetus gestates in the egg in the nest,
rather than internally in the bird’s uterus (De generatione, 4–5). Rather, Eli-
zabeth’s queer parrot, gendered masculine but anatomically female, is love
sick, green sick, or a hysteric, its putrefying egg like retained menses. The
story shortly precedes Harvey’s concerns about marriageable girls suﬀering
‘hysterical aﬀections’ that I discussed above. Harvey’s autopsy of the parrot
is an investigation not into pregnancy but rather female love-sickness, and
enables him to sort health from disease in the case of non-generation.
Harvey’s description of the parrot’s attempts to court his wife are full and
excessive, charting its ‘mutterings’ and ‘shaking of his wings’, its ‘familiarity’
and ‘obsequiousness’, its ‘singing and talking’ (24). The parrot dies, Harvey
says, in Elizabeth’s lap or bosom – his Latin word is gremium – which he
also uses earlier to denote the place the parrot liked to lay its head to be
stroked when it was alive. He complains that in life the animal ‘was now
grown so familiar, that he was permitted to walk at liberty through the
whole house’ (24), taking up an illegitimately intimate place in his marital
home, even in his wife’s lap. Keller has considered Harvey’s descriptions of
himself throughout his writing on generation and conception as a ‘torch-
bearer’ and ‘hero-adventurer’.52 Yet, in her concluding comments, she ﬁnds
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that Harvey’s ‘images of masculine triumph […] ultimately appear hollow,
generated, like the embryo itself, on a perceived absence’.53 In his resentment
of Elizabeth’s parrot, Harvey oﬀers something much more like that which
Keller describes in this conclusion. Any account of Harvey’s own marriage
or amatory feelings is displaced by his experience of this eccentric love tri-
angle. Indeed, in the competition for Elizabeth’s love, rather than being pre-
ferred to the parrot, Harvey only wins out by outliving and dissecting it.
Necessarily the relationship between Elizabeth and the parrot – a bird
which, anyway, turns out to be female – is un-generative, being impossible,
and, in that respect, Harvey chooses a curious love-rival against which to
measure himself.
The narrative of the parrot’s love is interrupted by a digression, derived
from Aristotle and, again, Virgil’s Georgics, on birds and windy reproduction.
Harvey says he reads in Aristotle that male birdsong can be carried on the
wind and fecundate a hen bird:
Aristotle saith, If partridge-hennes stand over against the cocks, and the winde
blow from whence the cocks are, they conceive and grow big, and for the most
part, they teem [ingravescunt] even by the voice of the cock, if they be at that
time wanton and lustfull (24)
Spiller sees in the discussion of birdsong the ﬁgure of the potent male artist
and, indeed, of Harvey himself.54 Yet what are described here are not necess-
arily fruitful conceptions. Harvey does not specify whether these are con-
ceptions with or without foetuses. Harvey’s Latin is more equivocal than
the English; the word ingravescunt [grow heavy] does not populate the
abdomen in the same way that English ‘teem’ does. Abdomens may swell
and gain weight, but not gestate or deliver young. Tellingly the lengthy quota-
tion from the Georgics which follows describes the fructifying descent of the
god Aether into the joyful womb, lap, or bosom of his consort: the earth.
The Latin phrase is ‘gremium laetae’, (Latin 14; English 25); and, as I noted,
Harvey uses the same word, gremium, twice elsewhere in his description of
Elizabeth’s intimate interactions with her pet. Whilst Harvey’s anecdote
about the parrot at ﬁrst appears to be about the parrot’s un-generative path-
ology, in the repetition of gremium, it also elliptically points out Elizabeth’s
un-generativeness, and a womb, which Harvey’s biography reminds us, did
not bear children.55 In this triangulation, Harvey’s own childless marriage
is oﬀered up in implicit contrast to the chaste but similarly un-reproductive
love that the parrot holds for Elizabeth. If animals are the commentary
which make explicit what is implicit in the human text, the parrot speaks elo-
quently, if obliquely, about Harvey’s personal interest in non-generation.
Elizabeth’s frustrated parrot also stands in contradistinction to those
broody birds that Harvey returns to throughout his writing on generation,
who incubate subventaneous or addled eggs. Pathological love-sickness, like
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the parrot’s, is not conception, unlike the wind eggs of mated birds. In this
way, Harvey credits false pregnancy and recognises that it provokes or is
accompanied by maternal behaviours in animals, which he observes with
some tenderness. For all that Keller is right on Harvey’s ‘sex stories’, and
Spiller, too, on his generative ﬁctions, we should also acknowledge Harvey’s
insight into non-generation. This is particularly evident at the moments
when Harvey self-interrupts with literary quotation particularly from the
Georgics; ﬁction oﬀers the best, because most immaterial, grounds for
approaching non-generation. However, Harvey’s use of Virgil’s poem is
characterised by resistance to its compulsory reproductive logic. In particular,
Harvey is careful not to exclude un-generative wombs, and particularly not
Elizabeth’s, from his version of the erotic descent of Aether. If Virgil had
used the spring winds to link eros and reproduction, Harvey instead ﬁnds
this erotic moment in Virgil’s text useful to consider not infertility exactly
but rather an in-between diagnostic state which may be generative, but
equally may not. Harvey understands that conceptūs without foetuses have
seasons, just in the way that fruitful ones do, that there are particular times
when expectations rise. Harvey replaces Virgil’s emphasis on reproduction
with another, on conception, and additionally oﬀers maternal aﬀection,
which is not a concern in Virgil’s poem, as a sign of a conception achieved
after intercourse. In this way, he digniﬁes the un-generative body by including
it in ancient erotic dramas which placed human sexuality in cosmological and
natural perspective. Furthermore he reorients his readers to consider birds
that sit on wind eggs – and perhaps the falsely pregnant women they resemble
– and to acknowledge their loves, desires and maternal ministrations, as much
as those whose sitting is rewarded with ‘chickens to discipline […] assemble,
nurture, feed and protect’ (71).
Whilst many critics have dismissed De conceptione as itself un-generative
and limited by its place in history, to his credit, Harvey recognises and is
reﬂective about his partial perspective. Unable to see the sperm ‘remaining
behinde in the female’ (548), he draws this blank:
What remains, since I can imagine nothing else, nor no man hath hitherto
dreamed of any other thing, but freely to profess my self to be at a stand? (548)
As Spiller has argued, Harvey’s work on generation and particularlyDe concep-
tione is concerned with his own act of creation; this passage is no exception.56
The question of the immaterial remnant links up Harvey’s fallacious obser-
vation of the material gap in conception to his confession about his own limit-
ations. Harvey anticipates that new light will come in, as indeed it has, asserting
that he contributes only a ‘conjecture’ until ‘there be some certainty established
in the business’ (547). His emphasis upon the imagination in the quotation
here demonstrates that his contribution is itself a conception in the terms
set out in his analogy: one that may or may not prove fruitful, that exists in
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a diagnostic in-between only to be resolved by time. He insists, though, that his
is no ‘monstrous matter’ (546), using the lexicon of teratology to defend his
conception from a charge of deformity. Harvey anticipated the bad press his
analogy would receive: ‘I know full well, that some scoﬃng persons will
laugh at these conjectures’ (546), he says, but defends his contribution on
the grounds that all opinions begin as ‘meere ﬁgments, and imaginations’
[mera ﬁgmenta & imaginationes] (546; Latin 297).57 His use of merum here
apparently empties ﬁction of its value except that he deploys the same word
in his awed account of the body’s powerful creative capacities. In De concep-
tione Harvey ﬁnds that conceptions are ‘mere’ works of the imagination, yet
they can be credited, even in the absence of a foetus, not only because they
are accompanied by biological symptoms of pregnancy, but also because
those symptoms are generated by erotic and romantic expectations and
signed bymaternal love. Love is crucial to Harvey’s symptomology of the intel-
ligent un-reproductive female body, and of a womb that can envisage, although
perhaps not always deliver, the children often looked for in a sexual life.
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